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Pressing questions about the merits of market
accountability in K-12 education have spawned a
large scholarly literature. Unfortunately, much of
that literature is of limited relevance, and some of
it is misleading. The studies most widely cited in
the United States used intense scrutiny of a few
small-scale, restriction-laden U.S. programs—and
a handful of larger but still restriction-laden for-
eign school choice expansions—to assert general
conclusions about the effects of “choice,” “com-
petition,” and “markets.” The most intensely
studied programs lack most or all of the key ele-
ments of market systems, including profit, price
change, market entry, and product differentia-
tion—factors that are normally central to any dis-
cussion of market effects. In essence, researchers
have drawn conclusions about apples by studying
lemons.
To address the need for credible evidence on
the effects of genuine education markets, econo-
mists should look to simulation models, indirect
evidence such as outcomes in similar industries,
and school systems abroad that enjoy varying
degrees of market accountability. 
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Introduction
The free market is the primary form of
organization and accountability for most of
the economy, and increased reliance on mar-
kets was the common denominator of suc-
cessful 20th century economic reforms.1
These facts, coupled with widespread dissatis-
faction over the quality of existing education-
al services, have raised interest in market-
inspired education reforms that fall under the
catch-all term “school choice.”
But despite considerable effort to discover
the effects of “school choice,” much that could
qualify as evidence has not been directly stud-
ied, and much relevant information is not
widely known. The limited educational choic-
es available in the United States have been
heavily researched, telling us how certain test
scores respond when some families make use
of current alternatives to their assigned public
school.2 But such constrained choices provide
little evidence about how true education mar-
kets might transform the status quo. Indeed,
Harvard economist Caroline Hoxby (whose
work has focused on U.S. schooling) believes
that “[market-based] reforms would propel
American schools into wholly unknown terri-
tory.”3 A RAND study determined that “none
of the important empirical questions has been
answered definitively. Even the strongest
[U.S.] evidence is based on programs that have
been operating for only a short period of time
with a small number of participants.”4
The novelty and minuteness of existing U.S.
school choice programs are not the only fac-
tors that limit their value in assessing the mer-
its of free-market education. Several key
aspects of market accountability are virtually
absent from those programs: price change, easy
market entry, and the profit motive, among
others. Prices determined by supply and
demand are a key attribute of markets, but they
are almost unheard of in K-12 education—even
under most school choice programs.5 Further-
more, existing private schools’ tuition rates are
greatly distorted by the taxpayer-funded com-
petition from “free” public schools.6
The difficulty of charging tuition when
the government offers “free” schooling is the
main barrier to market entry faced by private
schools in most of the world. That difficulty
not only impairs the effectiveness of private
schools, it affects the kinds of private schools
that can exist.7 The presence of “free” govern-
ment schools artificially favors certain kinds
of private schools, such as those that
• have large endowments;
• have access to church subsidies;
• can offer inexpensive services that pub-
lic schools cannot, such as devotional
religious instruction; and
• can offer high-value subject or pedagog-
ic specializations that appeal to only a
small share of the population.
Indeed, that artificially skewed and nar-
rowed menu of school types describes most
of the existing U.S. private education sector.
But while U.S. school choice research has
focused on very limited existing reforms and
the small and highly skewed niche of American
private schools, scholars have often used their
findings to make sweeping claims about com-
petition and market accountability in educa-
tion.8 Much of the alleged direct evidence of,
for example, the effects of “large-scale voucher
programs,” or market accountability through
full-fledged competition, is thus wrong, mis-
leading, or irrelevant.9 Misconceptions are
more stubborn foes than ignorance, so undo-
ing the effects of this imagined evidence is a
considerable challenge, and it is the key aim of
this review.10 I also describe the sorts of studies
that can be undertaken (and in some cases,
already have been undertaken) to truly deter-
mine the merits of market education.
What Is “School Choice”?
Before diving into an analysis of the “school
choice” research, the term itself merits clarifica-
tion. Except when choice occurs through resi-
dential relocation, “school choice” means a pol-
icy that improves access to alternatives to the
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assigned public school. Improved access, which
typically results from a drop in the relative
“price” of some alternative, may be universal or
limited to target groups, such as low-income
families or children in public schools formally
designated as failing.11 Therefore, “school
choice evidence” is mostly what we know about
the effects of changing the relative prices of
actual and potential schooling options. Note
that subsidies like vouchers and tax credits can
lower prices from families’ perspective while
raising them from the school operators’ per-
spective. By reducing disposable income, school
taxes increase the relative price of private
schooling. Interpretations of school choice
effects need to take account consistently of how
much policy reforms change the relative prices
to families and educators, and what fraction of
educators and schoolchildren had access to the
price changes. If a price decrease significantly
increases interest in alternatives to the assigned
public school, an entrepreneurial response may
yield a much-changed menu of schooling
options.
Since the array of policy options for ex-
panding school choice is poorly understood,
the next section briefly describes the policy
options that lower the cost, or enhance the
benefits, of leaving the assigned neighbor-
hood public school.12 The third section dis-
cusses false evidence and false assumptions
used to interpret evidence, while the fourth
outlines sources of valid evidence. 
Varieties of School Choice
Most U.S. children have an assigned public
school based on their home address.13 Private
school tuition can severely strain family bud-
gets, so residence choice is the most used
school choice strategy (#1). The costs of this
strategy may include relocation expenses and
trade-offs involving location issues such as
worksite and amenities. For school districts to
maintain the appearance of fairness, every
major district program must be available in
every attendance area. Therefore, choice
through residential relocation mostly yields
choice among “comprehensively uniform”
schooling options.14 Because school districts
cannot assign children to specialized schools,
choice by residential relocation cannot prompt
school systems to focus schools on specific
subject themes, or specific types of students, or
specific teaching styles. 
Supplementing residence choice are eleven
ways (#2–#12) to enhance choice, which means
selectively or universally reducing the relative
prices of the schooling options, sometimes by
the creation of new schools. These school
choice options are as follows:
(#2) Chartered, nondistrict public schools,
which are authorized by law in 40 states.15
Most charter laws let entities other than exist-
ing school districts authorize publicly funded,
less-regulated alternatives to assigned public
schools.16 As unzoned alternatives, charter
owners can pursue topical or pedagogical spe-
cialization, but their inability to turn away
mission-incompatible children can under-
mine such efforts. Every charter law creates
two price controls.17 Charter schools may not
charge tuition, which leaves it to the political
process to set the amount paid to charter
operators. A ban on parental copayments pre-
vents charters from offering services that cost
more than the state’s per-child payment (cre-
ating a price “ceiling”), while the guaranteed
state funding gives operators no incentive to
charge less for services that cost less than the
per-child payment (creating a price “floor”).
(#3) Choice among district public schools.
All but five states (Alabama, Maryland, Nevada,
North Carolina, and Virginia) pay at least statu-
tory lip service to “public school choice.”18 In
the states that don’t undermine it with restric-
tions or allow districts to opt out, open enroll-
ment among district public schools creates at
least temporarily (until the best schools fill)
some alternatives to the assigned school, and in
the 40 states with charter laws, it supplements
the choice between assigned and chartered.
(#4) Targeted tuition vouchers selectively
improve access to private schools. The target-
ing criteria include financial need (Arizona,
Cleveland, Milwaukee), attendance at a pub-
lic school deemed “failing” (“FloridaA”), and
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the disability or special needs status of a stu-
dent (Utah, “FloridaB”).19
(#5) Nonrefundable, personal use tuition
tax credits. Targeting of a different sort affects
a non-refundable credit’s utility to families.
Nonrefundability restricts the maximum size
of the credit to the specific personal tax liabil-
ities against which the credit can be applied
(income tax, sales tax, property tax, and so
forth). The combined magnitude of the eligi-
ble tax burden, and hence the credit’s value,
determines the extent to which the cost barri-
er to private schooling is lowered and thus the
likely extent of migration from the public to
the private sector. 
(#6) Nonrefundable, low-income scholar-
ship donation tax credit. This approach
broadens the potential tax liability base of the
credit to the vast majority of households that
do not have school age children, as well as to
businesses.20 It also has the significant politi-
cal and social virtue of shifting the schooling
benefits of the credit from higher to lower
income households. But only when coupled
with personal-use tax credits as described
above can donation credits change the school
choice calculus of middle- and upper-income
households, and thus capture much of the
potential to prompt entrepreneurially driven
change in the menu of schooling options.21
(#7) Refundable tuition tax credits. Fam-
ilies get a check when a refundable credit tops a
targeted tax liability, typically just income tax.
The credit’s cash value does not depend direct-
ly on the family’s tax liability, or indirectly on
the taxpayer’s income. As in the case of the
option-demand, universal voucher described
below, it is strictly a matter of legislative choice
whether private- and public-school users receive
equal subsidies, or whether the tax credit is a
large fraction of the tuition charged by the typ-
ical alternatives to the assigned public school.
(#8) “Pure” universal tuition vouchers. “Pure”
means that parental choice of school allocates all
of the public funds earmarked for approved
schooling. Public and private schools get the
same per-child subsidy. Although a child’s sub-
sidy would not depend on the school’s owner, it
could depend on age or academic status. 
(#9) Option-demand universal tuition
vouchers. “Option-demand” plans offer vouch-
ers to everyone who opts for a non-public
school.22 With an option-demand program,
public school funding and voucher value are
separate policy issues. Consequently, per pupil
funding for public schools can differ from the
value of a voucher. All of the formally proposed
option-demand programs offered vouchers
worth less than the public schools’ per pupil
funding. For example, California’s failed Prop-
ositions 174 and 38 (1993 and 2000, respective-
ly) offered option-demand universal vouchers
worth half of the public schools’ per pupil
funding level.23
(#10) Formal separation of school and
state. This would mean eliminating special
rules for schools, selling off existing govern-
ment education assets, and dropping educa-
tion subsidies funded by taxes.
(#11) Informal, compromised school-state
separation. Informal separation occurs when
free government-run schools are available but,
to a great extent, available in name only, be-
cause the schools are thoroughly dysfunction-
al—or actually unavailable, as in remote rural
areas. Compromised, informal separation is
found in developing countries to a substantial
extent, and it is arguably emerging in developed
countries, for example, in some of major U.S.
cities with a history of chronically ineffective
and reform-resistant public schools.24
(#12) Deregulation that allows greater dif-
ferences in schools. In countries such as Chile,
Sweden, and the Netherlands, where many
families can readily choose non-state, “inde-
pendent” schools, extensive regulations great-
ly reduce the potential for differences among
the school choices, which constitutes another
major school choice barrier.
Imagined Evidence
Owing to a widespread misunderstanding
of competitive markets, many researchers
have overlooked the absence of several key
elements of market accountability in existing
school choice programs. Economist Charles
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Manski notes that “consideration of [unre-
stricted] choice, to date, has been anything but
serious. The policy debate has been long on
advocacy and short on [relevant empirical]
analysis.”25 Jeffrey Henig observes that
The source of major conflicts and confu-
sions today [in interpreting school choice
research] derives from the absence of
clear guidance about how to move from
findings specific to one manifestation of
choice to more general conclusions.
Most of what we have learned about
school choice is based on evidence drawn
from two sectors—religious institutions
and public education—in which the key
actors and decision criteria are distinctly
not market driven.26
Every current school choice program, and
school system, lacks some of the key elements
listed below. They are especially scarce in the
widely cited U.S. programs. These typically miss-
ing market elements include the following:
• Low formal (regulatory) barriers to the
entry of new schools and to product
[schooling] differentiation (e.g., school
control of admissions and curriculum,
and consumer sovereignty; family will-
ingness to pay as the key determinant of
school financial viability)27
• Stability (a high degree of confidence in
constant or growing total demand) 
• Market-determined, flexible prices (e.g.,
permitting parental copayments under
voucher programs)
• Nondiscrimination in funding (e.g.,
public funding per child, if any, does not
vary significantly on the basis of school
sector or for-profit versus nonprofit sta-
tus) to ensure the level playing field
essential to an entrepreneurial response
• Some direct payment by the consumer,
in the form of tuition fees, as opposed
to third-party payments only28
Much misleading generalization rests on
facts stretched beyond their narrow relevance,
for example, asserting that experience with pub-
lic school choice provides insights into market
accountability: “Advocates and opponents fre-
quently overstate what is known about the con-
sequences of school choice.”29 Much overstate-
ment is implicit. For example, Table 1 in Teske
and Schneider is an overview of “studies of
choice types and outcomes.”30 The Teske and
Schneider overview table does not differentiate
between narrowly targeted vouchers and unre-
stricted universal programs, and it does not
include “supply-side response” in the table’s list
of potentially key school choice outcomes. The
student performance column merely lists stud-
ies that examine whether choosers gained by
moving to another part of the present system,
something we would expect just from confi-
dence in rational behavior. The dense list of
studies in the “Vouchers” column could leave
the impression that all of the important aspects
of vouchers have received considerable academ-
ic scrutiny. In fact, the opposite is true. Instead,
only a few narrowly relevant issues have received
much attention.
Many of the wrong, misleading, or irrelevant
statements about the effects of “competition”
stem from failure to define the term or acknowl-
edge the key elements listed above, and from
insufficient use of necessary qualifiers such as
“muted” and “fringe.” As Terry Moe noted, “it
usually makes little sense to ask whether vouch-
ers or charter schools, in some generic sense,
have particular effects,” but it happens a lot.31
Clifford Cobb noted that the mismatch between
restrictions on parental choice and rhetoric
about competition creates considerable confu-
sion.32 For example, two analysts have asserted
that “the nature of some of these [tiny, privately
funded voucher] programs allow for studies of
essentially Friedman-like [universal, same sub-
sidy level for all, plus ability to co-pay] voucher
arrangements.”33 As George Orwell said, “the
slovenliness of our language makes it easier for
us to have foolish thoughts.”34
Experience with 1950s/1960s Fear-Based
Choice
Some of the concern about stratification
and increased segregation stems from the
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1950s/1960s “fear-based choice” that was pro-
vided mostly to the privileged as a “backlash”
against the 1954 Brown Supreme Court deseg-
regation order.35 Often unsaid is that the desire
to stratify was of utmost importance to the
policy designers. Many of the tuition grant
programs enacted to resist the Brown decision
formally excluded blacks, and the vast majority
of the eligible schools did not admit black chil-
dren. Only Louisiana allowed a pursuit of prof-
it that might have prompted entrepreneurial
pressure to see the entire population as poten-
tial customers. The courts struck down all of
the 1950s/1960s school choice programs with-
out ruling on the voucher mechanism that,
when applied in a nondiscriminatory manner,
was found constitutional by the Supreme
Court’s 2002 Zelman decision.
Claims that uncontrolled opportunities to
opt out of assigned schools without relocating
would undermine integration efforts persist in
the face of both empirical and modeling evi-
dence to the contrary, and those who make the
claims seldom address the growing de facto seg-
regation of the assigned public school system.36
Hill pointed out that, “fears of [increased] re-
segregation and restratification depend on cer-
tain assumptions: very few good schools, that
school quality varies on one dimension from
high to low, and the real choosers will be the
good schools, which will have their pick of stu-
dents.”37 Implicit in the arguments that resegre-
gation will accelerate are entry barriers that pre-
vent an expansion of the supply of the better
schools. Those assumptions are often valid for
the current system, or the current system
amended with narrowly targeted, restriction-
laden school choice. The historical evidence dis-
cussed above, and the indirect evidence dis-
cussed later, indicates that those assumptions
will not apply to a mature, market accountabil-
ity–based system.
Competition Tried in Absentia
In developed countries, competition and
parental choice have only been implemented
piecemeal, or on a small scale. The school sys-
tems of these nations are restriction-laden or
extend choice to a narrowly targeted popula-
tion, or both. The opportunity for genuine
rivalry between schools has thus been mini-
mal, but virtually all studies of these systems
assert that competition is on trial. For exam-
ple, Fiske and Ladd claim that mere public
school choice created a “market” in New
Zealand.38 Other stunning examples of mis-
takenly assumed competition and market
forces include programs that cap market entry
and set prices (charter laws, and most current
voucher programs); policies that strongly
favor some school providers; and regulations
that give private schools very little leeway to
differentiate themselves from the public
schools or from each other. The much-publi-
cized dispute between Hoxby and Rothstein
was about a type of “competition” that had
nothing to do with markets, but with sup-
posed rivalry among political jurisdictions for
tax base and economic development.39
Half-hearted, partial market liberalization
can yield misleading results. For example, the
ineffectiveness and perverse side effects of pre-
sumed market reforms slandered capitalism
in South America, with dire consequences
only now becoming evident in places like
Venezuela and Bolivia.40 Likewise, the mostly
positive, but unspectacular, effects of “school
choice” discussed earlier may slander the gen-
uine market-based reforms that qualify as the
“tentative procedures” capable of yielding the
transformation needed by a K-12 system in cri-
sis. Though the evidence that receives virtually
all of the U.S. attention has little bearing on
the likely effects of competitive K-12 educa-
tion markets, the argument that “competi-
tion” cannot produce sufficient school-system
improvement is already appearing in putative-
ly authoritative journals and is being made by
prominent spokespersons in the newsletters
of influential think tanks.41 Eight years of
experience with the limited public school
choice created by the United Kingdom’s 1988
Education Reform Act was the basis of
Stephen Gorard’s non sequitur that “the prog-
nosis for the improvement effect of markets
on schools is not good.”42
Martin Carnoy and Helen Ladd have said
that the Chilean universal option-demand
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voucher program was an example of a “large,
unrestricted voucher program,” even though
Ladd noted the government’s tight control of
virtually all aspects of schooling.43 Gauri had
already documented Chile’s central microman-
agement, including price control.44 Earlier,
Carnoy overlooked the intensity of central con-
trol. He concluded that Chile had “fully subsi-
dized, deregulated private schools competing
head-on for pupils with de-regulated munici-
pality-run public schools.”45 Carnoy and Ladd
concluded that since the assumed (but in fact
largely absent) market forces had failed to pro-
duce the promised results, increased central
control was in order. 
Jeffrey Perloff’s Microeconomics text notes
that “When most people talk about competi-
tive firms they mean firms that are rivals for
the same customers.46 By this interpretation,
any market that has more than one firm is
competitive. However, to an economist, only
some of these multi-firm markets are compet-
itive.” The actual competitiveness of the set-
tings studied to gauge “market competition”
effects is a largely neglected, crucial issue. With
public school choice, the school choices are
not even separate firms. Even in the least
restrictive of the widely cited school choice
programs, the state-run sector easily satisfies
the monopoly definition used for antitrust
lawsuits. Certainly, the state-run system is the
dominant producer, with significant entry
barriers assuring that it is likely to remain so.
And in the dominant-producer/competitive-
fringe market of K-12 education, the domi-
nant producer is not even a firm, that is, not
directly customer-dependent.
Virtually all noneconomists attribute mar-
ket forces and “competition” to every setting
where an assigned school has a comparably
priced alternative, regardless of the often exten-
sive market-stifling restrictions that exist. The
most recent examples are Mitchell Pearlstein’s
review of voucher studies and Sol Stern’s
lament that market forces have shown them-
selves inadequate to the assumed imperative of
public school improvement.47 John Witte’s The
Market Approach to Education is about the initial
Milwaukee voucher program—a program “de-
signed to fail”—that included price control, set
a small voucher size, initially limited participa-
tion to 1 percent of Milwaukee public school
enrollment, and allowed only the then-rare sec-
ular private schools to enroll voucher users.48
Likewise, the Paul Peterson introduction to the
compilation of Education Next articles, entitled
Choice and Competition in American Education,
does not mention that the journal’s authors
describe only programs lacking the key condi-
tions of genuine market competition.49 Pre-
sumably, this means that Education Next, the
top nontechnical outlet of education reform
research, hasn’t seen an acceptable manuscript
discussing the differences between the levels of
rivalry present in American education and what
generally constitutes market competition.
Economists have also asserted the presence
of market forces that are in fact largely absent.
For example, the introduction to Market
Approaches to Education, written by the book’s
editor, Elchanan Cohn, says that its collected
essays will consider only public school choice
and narrowly targeted subsidies—approaches
that lack every key ingredient of a truly com-
petitive market.50 Despite the existing system’s
major entry barriers, and the fact that private
and public schools are not close substitutes,
Thomas Dee’s “Competition and the Quality
of Public Schools” attributes positive effects
on public school graduation rates to “compe-
tition” from increased private sector market
share.51 Since there is little incentive to active-
ly compete, and little evidence of actual rival-
rous behavior, Dee’s findings could be the
result of other predictable effects of a larger
private-school market share.52 For example,
with more private schools, parents are better
able to match their child’s unique characteris-
tics to the available schooling options.
Removal of children that would do better else-
where leaves behind more homogenous, easier
to teach public school classrooms. 
Many economists have ignored or rein-
forced distorted views of the various school
choice policies. Discussions of product differ-
entiation, price change, and entry-exit aspects
of market accountability are rare. The Belfield
and Levin literature review and their lengthy
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discussion of the effects of competition be-
tween schools does not mention price change,
profits, entry barriers, or regulation—all critical
components of the “market competition”53
they claimed to assess. Woodfield and Gunby
and Fiske and Ladd trumpet the presence of
“marketization” and “market competition” in
New Zealand, and then document the absence
of nearly all of the key features of a truly com-
petitive market.54 Some rivalry may exist among
New Zealand’s public schools, but the system
does not remotely resemble a competitive mar-
ket. The tightly regulated New Zealand system
lacks profits, entry/exit, and market-based price
change. Yet influential commentators, includ-
ing former U.S. Labor Secretary Robert Reich,
have cited the New Zealand experience as evi-
dence of what could be expected from a market-
driven system.55
Present U.S. school choice programs create
some potential for producer rivalry, but school
leaders have little authority or incentive to
engage even in that, much less to exhibit
aggressive competitive behavior. There are
high entry barriers, and the combination of
copayment limits, participation caps, and
means testing arguably rules out price change,
and all but rules out significant profit. Still,
Dolton asserts that “America has important
lessons for any country considering market-
led choice reforms.”56 The actual key lesson is
that market forces are largely absent but that
even small doses of increased freedom to
choose from a largely static menu of schooling
options can still produce measurable, though
modest and perhaps short-lived, improve-
ments.
Misleading Test Score Wars
Despite some dissent, higher test scores for
choosers are widely seen as the needed evidence
that choice “works.”57 Various scholars thus
argue over what the test results show, and the
resulting “storm over vouchers” often appears
on the front pages of the Wall Street Journal and
the New York Times.58 The market metaphor is
on trial despite the virtual absence of market
accountability. Test scores are inappropriately
seen as “political dynamite.”59 Hoxby gave
three reasons why it is “wrong-headed” to
insist that choosers achieve higher test scores
to see choice as a worthwhile reform: “(1)
Productivity with equal resources is the key
question and the choice schools typically have
fewer resources; (2) Schools left behind may
improve, invalidating comparisons; (3) Com-
parison criteria may be incomplete—data may
not reflect factors of importance to parents.”60
Hoxby disapproves of the test score com-
parisons because they are likely to be difficult
and unfair. But a more important objection to
the comparisons is the near-total irrelevance
of differences between the public and private
sectors of a school system widely seen as disas-
trously ineffective. In a nation officially “at
risk” because of poor academic achievement,
the key issue is which kinds of choice-based
reforms, if any, can maximize continuous
improvement as measured by more than sim-
ply test scores. Test score evidence that
choosers usually find a better choice from the
existing menu of schools does not tell us if
choice can prompt desirable changes in the
menu. Strong charter laws and narrowly tar-
geted vouchers prompt public school im-
provement, but a larger market accountabili-
ty–based transformation of the private sector
might instead prompt a gradual elimination
of public schools.61 And such a transforma-
tion may produce the better school system.
Experience says that a gradual but ultimately
significant loss of market-share of govern-
ment-controlled schooling is the most likely
outcome of market accountability. Clayton
Christensen and Michael Overdorf’s study of
organizational response to disruptive change
found that dominant firms typically fail to
improve enough to avoid eventual replace-
ment by newcomers.62
Intellectual Prisoners of the Status Quo
Differences between the current system’s
private and public schools are still widely
seen as telling evidence of what expanded
choice and the assumed resulting greater use
of private schools would mean.63 According
to Dan Goldhaber, “the superiority of private
schools’ ability to educate students is the cen-
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tral claim of those advocating choice, and a
central tenet in the claim that expansion of
public-private choice would improve the
overall quality of schools in the US.”64 The
typical current U.S. private school is not an
appropriate standard of excellence, either in
its current condition or based on past rates of
improvement. “Nation at Risk” test scores at
a lower cost are not proper objectives of
reform.65
The typical implicit assumption is that
greater use of private schools would improve
the K-12 results to the same extent that private
schools now yield better scores, which by offi-
cial measures is slight.66 But differences
between existing schools are not necessarily
good indicators of the benefits of increased
choice. Elimination of entry barriers would
significantly change the private share of K-12,
and the critical issue is not whether private
schools are now more effective than govern-
ment-run schools, or even whether they can be
under more market-friendly circumstances.67
It may turn out that public versus private own-
ership is just another specialization issue that
helps determine which school is best for which
child. The critical issue is which kind of
accountability yields and sustains the best sys-
tem, which could turn out to be a much dif-
ferent mix of private and public schools than
the United States now has.
Certainly, for applications of school choice
in bits and pieces to wring better results from
the present system, the differences in facilities,
funding, and governance procedures between
current private and public schools are impor-
tant. But it makes no sense to apply a static
world view when only programs that aim to
transform K-12 schooling truly qualify as
“tentative procedures,” that is, as procedures
capable of effecting systemwide transforma-
tion and testing the merits of real market
reform.68 The static view—being an intellectu-
al prisoner of the status quo—implicitly
assumes away the critical transformation
objective. For example, it takes a static view of
the private sector and assumes that private
schools overwhelmed with applications will
exercise school choice, not parents.69 Certain-
ly, that could be the immediate effect of a gen-
uine market system. But it would be tempo-
rary. In a genuine market system, shortages of
space at the most popular schools would elim-
inate themselves by initially pushing up prices
and hence encouraging their expansion and
imitation, which would at least partially
reverse the initial price increase.
A key claim made by proponents of large-
scale voucher programs is the potential for sig-
nificant change in the private share of the sys-
tem, both as an end in itself and as a potential
catalyst for public sector improvement. But
much discussion of that claim rests on the
implicitly assumed permanence of public sec-
tor comprehensive uniformity and the current
composition of the private sector (virtually
100 percent non-profit; mostly church-run).70
For example, Patrick McEwan makes much
ado about a detailed comparison of the cur-
rent U.S. public and private schooling sectors,
including church dominance of private
schooling.71 But then he concludes that the
need to change both sectors causes the data to
have little value for evaluations of large-scale
programs. In another bizarre application of
static thinking, differences in the student bod-
ies and “service mix” of current private and
public schools are the basis of a claim that pri-
vate schools are not more efficient than public
schools. For example, according to Levin, cur-
rent private schools would spend as much as
public schools if they had the same students
and service mix, that is, if private schools had
a broad mix of students and a comprehensive
array of services on every campus.72 But it is
inefficient to provide every noteworthy acade-
mic program in virtually every assigned school
and to randomly match students and educa-
tors, that is, to connect them in a classroom
without regard to the unique attributes of
both. It makes no sense to argue that private
schools would be no more efficient than pub-
lic schools if they behaved as inefficiently as
neighborhood public schools. Even in a sys-
tem with little market pressure to be efficient
(current public and private schools are mostly
not close substitutes), private schools are typi-
cally more efficient (comparable effectiveness
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at a lower per pupil cost) precisely because they
configure themselves differently and benefit
from non-random connections between stu-
dents and educators.
Ignoring Price Control
Especially shocking are economists’ (price
theorists’) failures to highlight and sharply criti-
cize price control by the present U.S. K-12 sys-
tem, virtually all of the world’s other K-12 sys-
tems, and the vast majority of proposed and
existing school choice programs. They could cite
massive tomes, or a flagship journal article by a
Nobel laureate—as well as 4,000 years worth of
bad experience with price control, including the
near failure of the American Revolution—on the
indispensability of market-determined prices as
sources of vital information and powerful incen-
tives.73 But they have not done so. Clive Belfield
and Henry Levin do not mention the price con-
trol present in most school choice programs.74
Fiske and Ladd ignore the price control in New
Zealand’s alleged experiment in “full parental
choice and competition.”75 Masato Aoki and
Susan Feiner’s “general guide to the economics
of the market approach” cited the well-known
Chubb and Moe plan as a prototypical market
approach.76 They did not challenge the Chubb
and Moe assertion that a market system can
(and should) include price control.77
Like Aoki and Feiner, Donald Frey men-
tions price control, but does not critique it or
explain how market-determined price change
could prompt product diversification and
innovation, regulate entry and exit into K-12
education and its subfields, force cost-cutting,
or other dynamic effects that economists fre-
quently acknowledge as inherent, critical ele-
ments of competitive markets.78 The same
thing is true of Derek Neal’s discussion, “How
Vouchers Could Change the Market for Edu-
cation,” and Ladd’s “critical view” of vouch-
ers.79 Julian Betts et al. have a general discus-
sion of the price system, but they do not
connect it to the K-12 situation, either to cri-
tique existing price control, to explain that
prohibiting voucher copayment with private
funds (which is included in most school
choice plans) creates price control, or to dis-
cuss potential effects of price decontrol.80
They note that while private copayment “is
not common practice under current voucher
programs, voucher schools could, in theory,
charge tuition and require parents to top off
[copay] the voucher amount.”81They assert
equity benefits for the copayment bans with-
out explaining how restrictions on school
spending by higher-income families ostensibly
helps lower-income families. Betts et al. also
fail to note or discuss the arguments that co-
payment bans harm virtually everyone, for
example, by reducing contemporary competi-
tive pressures and the incentive to develop
innovations that often start off too expensive
for anyone but the wealthy to afford.82 By pre-
cluding an initial high price for innovative
schooling practices copayment bans can keep
innovations from getting off the drawing
board. 
Price control is part of every charter law,
but economist Scott Milliman said that
Arizona’s charter school law had “initiated a
free market in public education.”83 Likewise,
Helen Ladd has said that charter schools are “a
market-based reform strategy,” and Joseph
Viteriti has said that “real competition” results
from strong charter laws even though, in addi-
tion to instituting price control, strong char-
ter laws mean that popularity with families,
financial viability, and lawful behavior is not
enough for schools to remain open.84 The gov-
ernment bureaus empowered to grant char-
ters can close popular schools for failure to
meet bureau standards. 
The Texas and Arkansas reform recom-
mendations of the Koret Task Force (which
included education economists) ignores
price control as a limitation of charter law
approaches to reform.85 Koret supported a
Texas legislative proposal for means-tested
vouchers that allows copayment and thus
avoids price control, but the task force did
not explain the importance of that provision
or how means-testing would reduce market
entry and distort market determination of
tuition (price) levels. The “Constraints on
Supply” section of a significant RAND study
makes no mention of price control.86
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Wrong Success Criteria
The alleged acid test of assumed, but usu-
ally absent, market forces is the public school
response.87 Dee opens by noting that “the fun-
damental premise for educational policies
that advocate school choice is that increased
competition can improve the quality of public
schools.”88 Likewise, according to Hess, “the
most commonly advanced argument for
school choice is that the market will force pub-
lic school systems to improve.”89 McEwan
cites the public school response as a key effec-
tiveness measure for “large-scale voucher pro-
grams.”90 And for many prominent reform
advocates, the Hoxby finding of modest acad-
emic gains from alleged competitive pressures
and nonsubstantive public school responses is
evidence that we cannot rely on market forces
to significantly improve schooling.91
If the reasoning behind the focus on public
school response were sound, major gains in
retailing, computers, and telecommunications
would not have been possible without better
performance by Sears, IBM, and the original
AT&T. Luckily that kind of reasoning was false
for those industries, as well as false generally.
Those industries made great progress even
while their once-dominant firms lagged. In-
deed, Christensen and Overdorf note that most
industries make great leaps forward, despite
lackluster performance from former industry
leaders.92 This and other strong indirect evi-
dence suggests that school system improve-
ment will require that public schools go the way
of Ma Bell, IBM, and Sears, claiming a much
smaller market share than is the case under the
current school system.93 Established market
leaders are only rarely up to the challenge of dis-
ruptive change. New competition typically
replaces them. And public school operators face
longer odds than industry leaders. The author-
ities that run public school systems can’t
respond as decisively as business CEOs, and a
shift from political control of K-12 to market
accountability is arguably much more disrup-
tive than the technological innovation pres-
sures examined by Christensen and Overdorf.94
The public school response to choice-based
reform is of great long-term significance only
for reform proposals that assure public schools
a large market share.
Promising Routes to 
Critical Evidence
Among the current U.S. programs, none
has the potential to generate serious market
accountability insights without major reforms.
For example, the Milwaukee program would
have to allow universal access to vouchers and
allow virtually unrestricted copayment. Since
none of the U.S. school systems with long-
standing choice programs contains the essen-
tial elements of market accountability, we are
decades away from a comprehensive empirical
analysis of a market accountability–based equi-
librium in this country.
That is not to say that reformers should
abandon efforts to create genuine experi-
ments in market accountability–driven K-12
education. Better to have direct domestic evi-
dence in decades than never to have it at all. In
the interim, however, it seems sensible to use
other, more indirect, sources of evidence that
are available today, and that, when taken
together, could prove compelling. Here I refer
to such forms of evidence as simulation mod-
els, analogies to other industries, and compar-
isons to school systems in other countries and
school systems that no longer exist. I discuss
these forms of evidence below. 
Simulation Models
Improvements in simulation models,
including sensitivity analysis with parame-
ters that can’t be estimated from present
data, are of the utmost importance.95 That is
probably the only way to explore the impor-
tance of key program features and assump-
tions about the nature of student, educator,
and entrepreneurial behavior, and the impli-
cations of the apparent significant diversity
in how children learn. 
As Dolton correctly noted: “This [simula-
tion modeling] is an extremely valuable—but
difficult exercise.”96 It is a valuable substitute
for unavailable empirical evidence, but quite
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difficult because data from the current system
are a dubious source of parameter estimates,
and because the inevitable, initial simplifying
assumptions can produce misleading results.
For example, the current leading efforts assume
one-dimensional student ability and school
quality and assume that quality depends only
on average student ability and school spend-
ing.97 In other words, they assume that school-
ing practices are uniform and that children—far
from being good at some things and average or
bad at others—are smart, average, or slow across
the range of different kinds of abilities. Hill
points out that school stratification by income
and ability should result from those conditions,
mobility, and school choice.98 Assuming more
plausible subject- or pedagogy-specialized
schools and multidimensional ability could
produce different results.99 Charles Manski rec-
ognized the potential for specialization, but
omitted it from his simulation model because
“the greater realism of a differentiated product
model carries with it greater complexity in char-
acterizing and finding equilibria.”100 But multi-
ple equilibria would be a key insight into the
likely nature of a market accountability–based
K-12 system. 
Modeling efforts typically do not quickly
incorporate every desirable nuance. Probably
they cannot. Early, crude models often identify
key modifications. For school choice issues, the
gradual, collaborative model-building process
is barely underway. The production functions
of inefficient, comprehensively uniform
schools, and the effects of residential mobility
are a dubious source of reliable estimates of
model parameters for studying market-based
policies.101 Therefore, analysts should conduct
sensitivity analyses of their findings by also
generating simulation results with hypotheti-
cal parameters created to reflect factors like low
entry barriers and market-driven price change.
Establishing the policy relevance of such find-
ings will be at least as challenging.
Indirect Evidence
Indirect evidence is plentiful; for example,
there are competitive industries that have
much in common with schooling. Or, to argue
that the current system’s problems are largely
inherent in non-market systems, we can study
industries and economic systems that lack the
profit motive and a price system (USSR, Cuba,
North Korea). The well-established superiority
of market over government provision of goods
and services may turn out to be the most pow-
erful evidence. The biggest challenge is to get
policymakers to take that evidence seriously.
Discovery and analysis of specific industries
with production functions like schooling is a
potential source of more specific insights into
the likely workings of market accountability–
based K-12 education. Other industries involv-
ing schooling, especially for children, promise
the best and most credible indirect evidence.
For example, market forces supply tutoring ser-
vices to children. I’m not aware of attempts to
develop lessons for K-12 reform from U.S.
tutoring markets, but Coulson’s study of the
Japanese market demonstrates that schooling
is not a special case in which capitalism disap-
points, while delivering the goods efficiently
elsewhere. Market-driven tutoring is quite pop-
ular with Japanese families and is widely regard-
ed as highly effective. That evidence deserves
further study and a wider audience. Again,
efforts to establish its relevance to school sys-
tem reform debates are at least as important as
the effort to extract additional information.
Vocational education serves mostly adults,
but programs that provide significant subsi-
dies for job training expenses may create
opportunities to tease out some insights on
the nature of private schooling subsidized by
vouchers or tax credits. Higher education also
involves adults and is fraught with hazards as
a source of lessons for market accountability.
Many private universities enjoy a buffer from
competitive pressures in the form of a large
endowment, and the much larger subsidies of
state universities create many of the same
problems found in the current U.S. K-12 sys-
tem. However, higher education studies may
be a good source of insights about critical
political dynamics, especially the evolution of
state-run universities into semiprivate
schools that is apparently underway in some
states.102
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Myron Lieberman’s The Educational Morass
compares school system practices to heavily sub-
sidized, restriction-laden, but still much more
market-oriented health care in order to argue
that more widespread use of market forces
would drastically change teacher training,
research practices, and the use of research.103
Again, the effort to establish the findings’ rele-
vance to potential choice-based reform is at least
as important as making the comparisons. The
general findings of Christensen and Overdorf
about industry change are good examples of evi-
dence that Christensen worked to credibly con-
nect to the K-12 reform debate.104
Too much is made of the new, restriction-
laden, foreign school choice programs (Chile,
New Zealand, and Sweden), while too little is
made of the differences between longstanding
school systems with widely different levels of
market accountability. Though no current
system possesses a high level of market
accountability, contemporary foreign school-
ing policies, as a group, provide a good, natur-
al, long-term experiment in the determinants
of differences in equilibrium outcomes.105 A
“natural experiment” involves studying the
outcomes of particular systems across varying
cultural and economic settings, looking for
consistent patterns. When a given system is
consistently associated with positive out-
comes regardless of socioeconomic context,
researchers can have some degree of confi-
dence that the given effects are in fact due to
the system itself and not to extrinsic factors,
since those factors will have varied from one
setting to another. Among the world’s nations
there are varying levels of subsidies for “inde-
pendent” schools and varying levels of regula-
tory control. Thus, reviewing this body of
experiences as a whole constitutes a relevant
and potentially highly informative natural
experiment.
The initial assessments of that evidence
make a strong case for school choice and mar-
ket accountability generally.106 Programs with
higher levels of market accountability are con-
sistently more efficient than more restrictive
programs. Specifically, international examples
spanning thousands of years—including true
market situations existing as recently as the
1800s—universally show that greater direct
financial responsibility for parents, less regula-
tion of schooling practices, effective competi-
tion, and increased opportunity to profit from
popular schooling practices improve school
system effectiveness and efficiency. A compar-
ison of state systems in the United States sup-
ports the same conclusion. Differences in the
education market activity levels of U.S. states,
low as they all are under just slightly different
versions of the current system, still register
directly as determinants of increased academ-
ic effectiveness and efficiency.107 It’s certainly
not a matter of finding a system to copy. It’s a
matter of identifying the likely critical ele-
ments of highly effective school systems by
taking advantage of the natural experiments
described above. The elements thus adduced
can then be fine-tuned to place-specific con-
temporary political and economic circum-
stances, as necessary.
To establish the policy-relevance of the
historical examples of schooling driven by
producer and consumer choice that pre-date
the 20th century, scholars must address dif-
ferences in culture and differences between
current economic and political conditions
and those prevailing then.108 And since data
suitable for scientific empirical analysis are
likely unavailable from historic archives (at
least prior to the 19th century), scholars will
have to rely on carefully constructed compar-
isons akin to the natural experiment created
by international differences in contemporary
school systems.
There seems to be virtually unlimited
potential to develop evidence from compro-
mised separation of school and state. Though
potentially insightful on key questions such as
the importance of price change, degree of
product differentiation, stratification, and
rate of change, the findings will understate the
private sector response to uncompromised,
low formal entry-barrier opportunities to cre-
ate private schools. Understatement will result
because a compromised separation of school
and state forces schooling entrepreneurs to
compete with government-run schools for
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resources such as school sites, teachers, and
other school personnel. Potential classroom-
clearing improvement in the free government-
run alternatives to the fee-charging private
schools casts a pall of uncertainty over private
school investment decisions. And payment of
school taxes reduces the ability to pay fees.
Therefore, a key issue to address in some of
the initial studies is the degree to which the
continued government presence compromis-
es the outcomes. From the work of Tooley
and Dixon, we know that entrepreneurs can
compete effectively with the free government-
provided schooling in developing countries,
but we don’t know the extent to which the
government’s use of schooling resources and
its mere presence impacts the character of pri-
vate schooling enterprises and their market
share.109 For example, it may be that the low
labor costs of developing countries allow for
cheap, labor-intensive production of school-
ing that is competitive with the terrible
schooling available at no charge. With high
labor intensity production, little is invested,
so little is at risk in case government-provided
free schooling were suddenly to respond to
one of the many high-profile initiatives osten-
sibly aimed at that result.110 That risk to pri-
vate school providers may cause more capital-
intensive approaches to appear even more
costly than they already are in capital-poor
developing countries.
Despite reports of horrifically dangerous
and academically dysfunctional schooling in
major U.S. cities, the entrepreneurial response
to low income family despair with public
schooling has yet to match the response found
in developing countries. Why? The answers
could prove to be quite valuable. Certainly, rel-
ative price differences will be a significant part
of the answer. Labor is not cheap in the United
States, and urban public schools may not be as
bad as their counterparts in developing coun-
tries. Developed countries enjoy relative capi-
tal abundance, so with increased development
of software and the internet, a capital-inten-
sive approach to private schooling may even-
tually become inexpensive and effective
enough to draw a large number of low-income
U.S. families away from their assigned, “free”
neighborhood public school.
Summary and Concluding
Remarks
We lack direct answers to pressing ques-
tions about market accountability as a trans-
formation catalyst, and imaginary evidence
confuses the K-12 reform debate. The impor-
tance of the K-12 reform issue and the demand
for empirical evidence has led to intense scruti-
ny of the small, restriction-laden U.S. choice
programs and, increasingly, of more informa-
tive but still quite limited foreign programs.111
Failure to recognize major differences between
the key elements of market accountability and
the conditions of existing school choice pro-
grams, and the inability to address key issues
with direct empirical evidence, led to creative
attempts to “tease out findings from existing
arrangements.”112 And many of the findings
were important. Limited programs, which are
the most likely to yield some of the negative
effects claimed by choice opponents, did not
produce the extensive creaming, increased
stratification, and budgetary consequences
that have been the fodder of anti–school choice
campaign commercials.113 But presentations
of some findings have been misleading, espe-
cially regarding the potential for competition
to be the much sought-after transformation
catalyst. Certainly choice opponents were eager
to trumpet the modest effects of the school
choice “experiments.” But the modest effects
prompted some scholars and authoritative
proponents to declare their misgivings about
the utility of “competition” as a transforma-
tion catalyst.114 Alleged “proxies for competi-
tion” have severe limitations, yet economists
are among the analysts that have generalized
effects of weak rivalry into alleged evidence of
market accountability.115 At the same time,
economists have done little to correct or pre-
vent poorly grounded pronouncements about
the likely nature of a competitive education
industry. The resulting persistence of the imag-
ined evidence undermines a fair comparison of
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market accountability and the multiple exist-
ing versions of political accountability.
The challenges are especially severe for the
well-established, virtual indispensability of
market-determined prices, something well-
known within the economic profession but
not beyond.116 Based on that general evidence,
integration into the economywide price sys-
tem is a likely imperative almost entirely unac-
knowledged in calls for K-12 reform. Price
change clears markets, prompts product diver-
sification and innovation, regulates entry and
exit into industries and their subfields, forces
cost cutting, and has other dynamic effects
that economists frequently acknowledge. But
economists have not forced those issues into
K-12 reform debates by criticizing the current
system’s lack of a price system, documenting
the effects of price control in K-12, or protest-
ing its absence from most proposed school
choice programs.
Direct U.S. evidence is not imminent, and
there are repeated reminders of the urgency of
K-12 reform, from the declarations of biparti-
san commissions to the existence of armies of
functionally illiterate high school gradu-
ates.117 The failure of frenzied, decades-long
public school reform efforts, as well as evi-
dence from other fields that dominant pro-
ducers rarely transform themselves, compels
us to broaden the body of evidence under con-
sideration. New international and indirect evi-
dence must be developed, and its credibility
established, to permit a fair, near-term assess-
ment of market accountability as a K-12 trans-
formation agent.
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